The next session of the Research Seminar of the Chair Energy and Prosperity will take place on Thuesday 23 of October at 4:00 PM at the Agence Française de Développement. We will receive John E. Roemer (Yale University) for an initial speach on:

How we cooperate: A Kantian explanation

Standard game theory’s theory of cooperation is based upon threatened punishment of non-cooperators in a repeated game, which induces a Nash equilibrium in which cooperation is observed. Thus, cooperation in games is explained as a non-cooperative equilibrium.  Behavioral economics, on the other hand, explains cooperative behavior by inserting ‘exotic’ arguments into preferences (altruism, fairness, etc.), and again deducing cooperation as a Nash equilibrium in a game with non-standard preferences.   In both variants, cooperation is envisaged as achievable as a Nash equilibrium.

A more compelling approach is to model individuals as using a Kantian optimization protocol, but with standard, non-exotic preferences.  The Kantian protocol inserts morality not into preferences, but into the optimization protocol, and these are distinctly different approaches, as I show. We deduce cooperation in one-shot games in Kantian equilibrium. Kantian optimization resolves both tragedies of the commons and the provision of public goods: Kantian equilibria, in both cases, are Pareto efficient, in contrast to Nash equilibrium.  Furthermore, I characterize the class of 2 x 2 symmetric games in which Kantian optimizers will drive Nash optimizers to extinction, and conversely; both are non-empty classes.

GENERAL INFORMATION
Date :  October 23 4:00 to 6:00 PM
Place :  AFD – 5 Rue Roland Barthes, 75012 Paris – Attention : une pièce d’identité vous sera demandée à l’entrée du bâtiment et prévoyez d’être un peu en avance (du fait des contrôles de sécurité).

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