We consider the problem of stopping a diffusion process with a payoff functional involving probability distortion. We study stopping decisions of naïve agents who reoptimize continuously in time, as well as equilibrium strategies of sophisticated agents who anticipate but lack control over their future selves’ behaviors.
Keroboto B. Z. Ogutu, Fabio D'Andrea, Michael Ghil, Charles Nyandwi
The CoCEB model is used to evaluate hypotheses on the long-term effect of investment in emission abatement, and on the comparative efficacy of different approaches to abatement. While many studies in the literature treat abatement costs as an unproductive loss of income, we show that mitigation costs do slow down economic growth over the...
This paper presents novel approach about ethnic polarization in a country and extends its relevance beyond social conflict and civil wars to subjective well-being (SWB) and relational capabilities construct.
How do inequality and growth evolve in the long run and why? This paper analyses the interplay between household debt, growth and inequality within a monetary, stock-flow consistent framework.
Abstract: The stagflation phenomenon is regarded as one of the cause of the Keynesian paradigm breakdown in the 1970s. The New Classical school took...
In this paper we study how the electricity market characteristics determines the choices made by electricity generators in the U.S. market for SO2 allowances.
In Europe the transport sector contributes about 25% of total GHG emissions, 75% of which come from road transport. Contrarily to industrial emissions road...
