Article published in Energy Economics – Oct 2017
Output-based allocations (OBAs) are typically used in emission trading systems (ETS) with a fixed cap to mitigate leakage in sectors at risk. Recent work has shown they may also be welfare enhancing in markets subject to supply and demand shocks by introducing some flexibility in the total cap, resulting in a carbon price closer to marginal damage. We extend previous work to simultaneously include both leakage and volatility. We study how OBA permits can be implemented under an overall cap that may change with the level of production in contrast with a design that deducts OBA permits from the overall permit allocation as is the current practice in the EU- ETS and California. We show that introducing OBA permits while keeping the overall cap fixed would only increase price fluctuations and induce severe welfare losses to non-OBA sectors.
> Download the initial working paper (May 2017)
> Buy online the published article (Oct 2017)
Découvrez en ligne la dernière newsletter et inscrivez vous pour recevoir la prochaine
La crise climatique est source de risques financiers désormais reconnus comme porteurs d’incertitudes multiples, et susceptibles de détériorer l’équilibre du système comme celui de ses acteurs. Ce séminaire sera l’occasion d’aborder plusieurs questions stratégiques soulevées par les risques climatiques tant pour les banques que pour les autorités de tutelle.
