Article published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management – Oct 2017.
We study pollution permit markets in which a fraction of permits are allocated to firms based on their output. Output-based allocations, which are receiving increasing attention in the design of carbon markets around the world (e.g., Europe, California, New Zealand), are shown to be optimal under demand and supply volatility despite the output distortions they may create. In a market that covers multiple sectors, the optimal design combines auctioned permits with output-based allocations that are specific to each sector and increasing in its volatility. When firms are better informed about the latter or must self select, the regulator resorts to some free (i.e., lump-sum) allocations to sort firms out.
> Download the initial working paper (July 2017)
> Buy online the published article (Oct 2017)
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La crise climatique est source de risques financiers désormais reconnus comme porteurs d’incertitudes multiples, et susceptibles de détériorer l’équilibre du système comme celui de ses acteurs. Ce séminaire sera l’occasion d’aborder plusieurs questions stratégiques soulevées par les risques climatiques tant pour les banques que pour les autorités de tutelle.
